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Abstract 
Notes the ambiguities within the party wall legislation. Describes the 'proceduralist' 
and 'rightist' approaches to interpretation of the statute. Provides examples of each 
approach. Traces the development of the current judicial approach to interpretation 
and describes surveyors' responses to this. Cites the recent case of Frances Holland 
School v Wassef [2001] as demonstrating the consistency of the judicial approach. 
Discusses issues, raised by the case, relating to ex parte awards and the statutory 
definition of 'owner'. Concludes that surveyors should follow a rightist approach to 
the legislation whilst also understanding the limits of the rightist doctrine. 
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Introduction 
Ambiguities within the Party Wall etc. Act 1996 make the statute notoriously difficult 
to interpret.1 Indeed, these ambiguities predate the introduction of the current Act2 
and explain the tradition of debate which has existed amongst practitioners under the 
earlier London Building Acts, and which continues under the present legislation.3
 
 
Many of these debates address the nature of the surveyor's statutory role and focus on 
the risks for surveyors of inadvertently creating invalid awards. Particular areas of 
disagreement are often rooted in more fundamental differences of opinion about the 
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underlying legislative purpose of the statute. In this context two broad schools of 
interpretation can be identified. The first has been described as the 'proceduralist' 
school, and the second, as the 'rightist' school.4
 
 
This paper describes these two schools of interpretation and provides examples of 
their approach to the legislation. Based on recent reported caselaw, it also considers 
which approach should properly be followed by surveyors appointed under the 
present Act. 
 
Two schools of interpretation 
Proceduralist school 
The 'proceduralist' school places its emphasis on the various procedural mechanisms 
within the legislation. These include the service of notices and the appointment of 
surveyors to resolve disputes. These mechanisms are viewed as providing a 
procedural framework for resolving a variety of disputes between neighbouring 
owners during construction operations affecting a common boundary. 
 
In undertaking what is effectively a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the 
surveyors are often described as delivering 'helpful and cheap' solutions to problems5 
which would otherwise have to be referred to solicitors, and ultimately, to the courts.6
 
  
This approach emphasises the practical, pragmatic and common-sense approach 
which surveyors bring to the resolution of construction-related disputes and it would 
certainly challenge the notion that the surveyors perform any kind of arbitral or 'para-
legal' function.7 
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Rightist school 
The 'rightist' school would not fundamentally disagree with this analysis but would 
argue that it neglects the main purpose of the legislation. Specifically, it sees this as 
being concerned with the regulation of property rights between the parties.8
 
  
In particular, by granting the right to undertake work to boundary structures, the Act 
is seen as authorising an interference in the property rights of adjoining owners. As 
adjoining owners are thereby deprived of any protection by the law of trespass, the 
Act is seen as providing an alternative form of protection. This takes the form of a 
statutory right not to be subjected to unnecessary inconvenience during the course of 
the works as well as (usually) a right to have any damage to their property made good 
on completion.9
 
 
The rightist school would argue that the surveyors' statutory function should be 
viewed in these terms. It would reject the notion that the surveyors provide a general 
alternative dispute resolution service for the parties. Instead, it would argue that, 
jointly, they constitute a statutory tribunal10
 
, which is charged with the specific task of 
achieving an equitable balance between the competing statutory rights of each of the 
parties. 
Most advocates of the rightist school would not suggest that this role was directly akin 
to that of an arbitral tribunal.11 Most would share the proceduralist school's 
understanding of the practical and technical nature of the surveyors' task. This 
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involves surveyors in achieving a balance between the competing rights by addressing 
operational issues rather then adjudicating directly on the rights themselves.  
 
Nevertheless, certain legal consequences inevitably arise from the classification of the 
surveyors as a tribunal. In particular, in common with all tribunals, the surveyors' 
tribunal must act only within its proper jurisdiction and must only exercise powers 
which have been properly conferred upon it.12
 
 
The different approaches 
It can be seen from this analysis that the rightist school must inevitably favour a more 
restrictive interpretation of the legislation. This applies, both to the overall scope of 
the legislation, and to the nature of surveyor's role within it.  
 
In contrast, by emphasising the general benefits of the statutory procedures, and of the 
surveyors' involvement within them, the proceduralist school takes a more liberal 
approach to interpretation. For this reason it will often be far more willing to 
contemplate the use of the legislation to resolve issues in novel situations and to 
sanction the exercise of powers by surveyors which facilitate this. 
 
Examples of the different approaches 
Approach to the scope of the legislation 
Section 1(5) of the Act provides a useful example of the two approaches in the 
context of the general scope of the legislation. That section regulates the construction 
of new boundary walls where land is presently unbuilt upon.  
 
Paul Chynoweth 
The proceduralist school argues that a building owner can elect to serve notice when 
constructing a new wall along his own side of a boundary, even where this would 
involve no encroachment onto neighbouring land.13
 
 By triggering the statutory 
procedures, service of a notice is seen as inherently beneficial. It provides for the 
involvement of surveyors in a potentially problematic situation whilst also providing 
the building owner with a statutory right of access onto adjoining land. 
The rightist school rejects this interpretation. It argues that the statutory procedures 
only have relevance where there is some interference with the property rights of the 
adjoining owner. In the context of section 1(5) this would restrict the building owner's 
entitlement to serve notice to those situations where he intends to exercise the 
statutory right, under section 1(6),  to place projecting foundations on his neighbour's 
side of the boundary line.14
 
 
Approach to the surveyors' statutory role 
The proceduralist school's approach to the surveyors' statutory role is best illustrated 
by the practice which developed, over many years, under the London Building Acts. 
Once appointed under that legislation, surveyors would adopt a constructive and 
pragmatic approach to their task. They would frequently address a range of boundary-
related issues as they arose during a construction project, whether or not they strictly 
fell within the legislation. A high level of co-operation between surveyors also 
ensured that matters could be progressed efficiently without necessarily following the 
stated legislative requirements to the letter.  
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Indeed, with some justification, this approach is often seen as one of the strengths of 
the London regime. In this context, Leach has noted that that Act's provisions worked 
well, precisely because "their operation has been left so much to surveyors who have 
not been too analytical or too inquisitive as to the exact scope of their powers 
thereunder".15
 
 
Clearly, a positive and co-operative culture developed amongst surveyors practising 
under the London Building Acts. This ensured that, for years, the proceduralist 
school, with its ADR model of the surveyors' role, delivered very significant benefits 
to the clients who were served by it.  
 
For as long as this practice remained the norm there is also evidence that, on 
occasions, the courts were prepared to take their lead from surveyors and to endorse 
the custom and practice which had developed, or at least, to turn a blind eye to it.16
 
 
The judicial approach 
Development of current position 
The difficulty for the proceduralist school lies in the fact that, subject to this small 
number of possible exceptions, the overwhelming body of reported case law favours 
the approach taken by the rightist school. 
 
Because of the successful operation of London custom and practice, comparatively 
few cases have come before the courts since the enactment of modern party wall 
legislation in 1855. The case law has therefore taken time to develop. However, by 
the 1970's the judicial approach to the legislation had become clear and this was 
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reiterated with devastating clarity in the seminal case of Gyle-Thompson v Wall Street 
(Properties) Ltd.17
 
 Brightman J's words are as clear an endorsement of the rightist 
school's approach as one is likely to find anywhere: 
"...the....Act give[s] a building owner a statutory right to interfere with the 
proprietary rights of the adjoining owner without his consent and despite his 
protests. The position of the adjoining owner, whose proprietary rights are 
being compulsorily affected, is intended to be safeguarded by the surveyors..... 
 
Those surveyors are in a quasi-judicial position with statutory powers and 
responsibilities......therefore.....the steps laid down by the Act should be 
scrupulously followed throughout, and short cuts are not desirable........the 
approach of surveyors to those requirements ought not to be casual."18
 
 
In this case the court held that the surveyors had exceeded their statutory powers by 
awarding that a party fence wall could be reduced in height without the consent of one 
of its owners. No such right existed in the 1939 legislation under which the case was 
decided. It also held that, in any event, the surveyors had no jurisdiction to act 
because of their failure to comply with the Act's strict requirements regarding service 
of notices and appointment of surveyors. 
 
Lest surveyors were in any doubt that the courts would no longer tolerate the 
established custom and practice, the case of Woodhouse v Consolidated Property 
Corporation Ltd19 provided a further warning. In that case a Third Surveyor's award 
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which purported to deal with damage that arose before surveyors had actually been 
appointed was set aside.  
 
Response by surveyors 
Anstey and Vegoda's observations on this case provide some indication of how it was 
received by the profession: 
 
".....the Court of Appeal.....made the astonishing ruling that surveyors only had 
power to decide whether and how a building owner had the right to carry out 
works under [the Act]. In order to justify this judgement, they indulged in 
some very selective quotation from the 1939 Act....This was, however, plainly 
wrong - and there is no doubt about it. 
  
.......Unfortunately, it was clear that the surveyors had been appointed after the 
damage had been done, and although it was the custom of surveyors not to let 
petty procedural matters like that stand in the way of helpful and cheap 
resolution of differences, this case tended to make them more wary about 
doing so."20
 
 
Although many surveyors undoubtedly became more wary, there remains, as 
indicated by the tone of the quotation, a deep-seated reluctance to accept the 
legitimacy of the court's apparently new approach to the legislation. The established 
custom and practice had operated successfully in the capital for over a century and 
had, at the very least, received the courts' tacit approval during this time. Many 
surveyors understandably felt that it was now rather late in the day for the courts to 
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challenge this custom and practice and regarded these decisions as an unwarranted 
interference in areas properly falling within their own areas of competence. 
 
Unfortunately, although taking time to develop in coherent form, the courts' approach 
is well supported by a significant number of earlier decisions21 and does now 
represent the consistent and established view of the judiciary towards the legislation. 
Although personally unhappy about the changes, Anstey had no illusions about their 
effect and provided numerous warnings about their implications for practitioners.22
 
 
Despite these warnings, many surveyors remain sceptical about the message and this 
partly explains the continuing popularity of the proceduralist school. However, unless 
these warnings are heeded, surveyors' awards will continue to be overturned by the 
courts. 
Frances Holland School v Wassef 
A recent case provides the latest example of this. The decision in Frances Holland 
School v Wassef 23
 
 once again reaffirms the rightist approach which is now being 
followed by the judiciary. This case set aside a surveyor's award on the basis that it 
was made without proper jurisdiction under the 1939 Act.  
The case arose in connection with construction works undertaken by the Frances 
Holland School in London SW1. The works involved the demolition and rebuilding of 
two buildings on the School's land. Both buildings shared party walls with a 
neighbouring property. That property was occupied by Mr and Mrs Wassef as 
statutory tenants under the Rent Act 1977. The work also involved adjacent 
excavations, which necessitated underpinning the Wassef's property. 
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Notices were served on the Wassefs under the 1939 Act and surveyors were appointed 
by each of the parties. The surveyors then published a number of awards which 
regulated the various stages of the demolition and rebuilding work.  
 
However, there came a point when the Wassef's surveyor wished to publish a further 
award dealing with certain outstanding matters. The School's surveyor felt that these 
were best left until the works had been completed and this resulted in an empasse.  In 
an attempt to resolve this, the Wassef's surveyor thereupon published an ex parte 
award which addressed the outstanding issues. 
 
The School appealed against this award to the county court. During the course of the 
proceedings, the court had to consider whether the surveyor had proper jurisdiction to 
make the award. This was potentially compromised by two issues. 
 
Definition of "owner" 
The first issue related to whether the Wassefs, as statutory tenants, fell within the 
definition of "owner" in the Act. If they did not then the service of notices, and all 
subsequent statutory proceedings, would be rendered invalid.  
 
The judge expressly approved the rightist doctrine that the party wall legislation was 
concerned with the regulation of property rights between owners. On this basis, the 
legislation must be limited to those who hold legal interests in land and statutory 
tenants must, by definition, be excluded from this.  
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The surveyors therefore had no jurisdiction to make awards in the present case, as the 
Wassefs should never have been served with notices at the outset. 
 
Jurisdiction to make 'ex parte' awards 
The second issue concerned the circumstances in which a party-appointed surveyor 
becomes entitled to make an award ex parte. The legislation authorises this in 
circumstances where the other surveyor refuses to act or fails to do so for 10 days 
after having been requested to do so in writing.24
 
  
In the present case the Wassef's surveyor had served the appropriate request but the 
other surveyor had promptly responded to the effect that he did not consider any 
further action was appropriate until completion of the works. 10 days later the 
Wassefs' surveyor then issued the ex parte award, citing this response as a refusal to 
act. 
 
Once again, the court favoured a rightist approach, which had close parallels with the 
decision in Gyle-Thompson. Because of the Act's drastic consequences (interference 
with property rights) the court noted that surveyors are required to comply strictly 
with its provisions. 
 
The Wassef's surveyor had failed to do this. He relied on procedural steps designed to 
establish a neglect to act as justification for asserting that the other surveyor had 
refused to act. According to the evidence the court was not satisfied that there had 
been either a refusal or neglect to act within the terms of the legislation. 
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The judgement provides useful guidance for surveyors when exercising the Act's 
powers to make ex parte awards: 
 
".....the surveyor can rely either upon a refusal, or upon a [written request] that 
complies with the provisions of the Act, or, where appropriate, upon both 
grounds. The relevant grounds must be expressed in the ex parte award. 
 
In this case, there was no reference to a neglect to Act by [the School's 
surveyor]. Accordingly, the ex parte award is inconsistent with the reference 
to the 10-day time limit in the [written request].......In those circumstances I 
consider that the ex parte award is bad on its face and invalid."25
 
 
Conclusions 
This latest case should come as no surprise. It simply reiterates a judicial approach to 
the interpretation of the party wall legislation which is now firmly established. 
 
It confirms, once again, that the courts will instinctively apply the rightist school of 
interpretation to cases under the Act. They see the legislation as regulating substantive 
property rights between neighbouring owners. Because the Act authorises an 
interference with those rights, the courts will insist that its procedures are followed to 
the letter. They will also insist that surveyors only address issues which fall properly 
within the ambit of the legislation.  
 
Although the proceduralist approach undoubtedly worked well under the London 
Building Acts for many years, the courts have, for some time, taken an entirely 
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different approach to the legislation. A failure by surveyors to appreciate this will 
result in them acting outside their jurisdiction or in excess of their statutory powers. In 
either event, this may lead to the courts declaring their awards to be invalid. 
 
Despite this situation, it must also be said that the rightist approach only operates to 
define the parameters of the legislation. It certainly represents no change to the 
substance of the surveyor's role, which continues to involve the practical and common 
sense approach which has always been emphasised by the proceduralist school. The 
reported cases clearly establish that, where the surveyors remain within the 
parameters of the legislation, the courts will rarely interfere with the contents of their 
awards.26
 
 
This situation presents a significant challenge for surveyors. They must continue to 
perform their traditional function but within the tight legal constraints which now 
prescribe the limits of their role. This requires the simultaneous and instinctive 
exercise of a number of surveying and legal skills. It is certainly no easy task for 
anyone - whichever school they belong to in the debate. 
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